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1 AN OVERVIEW
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the Ghanaian
economy was characterized by high inflation rates,
low productivity, falling exports and sluggish (and
often negative) real GDP growth. Real per capita
GDP fell by more than 2 per cent per annum during
this period compared to the late 1960s level. By the
early 1980s, the economic situation in Ghana had
become critical.
The poor performance stemmed from gross price
distortions which destroyed incentives for increased
domestic production and exports; an overvalued
exchange rate which discouraged exports through
official channels; growing fiscal deficits, financed
principally by borrowing from the central bank
leading to rapid money supple expansion which
exerted inflationary pressure; the drying up of
external aid and accumulation of payment arrears.
These problems were aggravated by external shocks
such as the oil crises, a persistent downward trend
in the terms of trade, and a crippling drought in
1981-1983 which sent the inflation rate to a
triple digit level.
In 1983, the country was on the brink of complete
economic collapse. In order to arrest this seem-
ingly irreversible erosion of the country's economic
and social foundations, the PNDC government
introduced radical changes in economic policies
in April 1983. Initially, most of the policies
under the ERP aimed at macroeconomic stabili-
zation addressing the most serious economic
distortions and imbalances. Key elements of the
ERP included:
a realignment of relative prices in favour of export
sectors especially c'icoa, timber and minerals;
b restoration of monetary and fiscal discipline
leading to a reduction of the fiscal deficit and
reduction of inflation;
c a progressive shift away from direct controls
and intervention toward greater reliance on market
forces;
d reform of the exchange rate system.
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In spite of the substantial progress made in stabiliz-
ing the economy, it was realized that the economy
faced major structural problems which required in-
stitutional and production capacity enhancement
over at least a decade. To address these problems and
to lay a firm foundation for sustained economic
growth, the ERP was followed by the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1987. The objective
of the Structural Adjustment Programme was to
consolidate the gains of the ERP and to undertake
institutional reforms to enhance the efficiency of
the economy and encourage expansion of private
savings and investments.
2 OUT-TURN (1 983-92)
The Ghanaian economy recorded a remarkable
recovery since the institution of the ERP in 1983. Real
GDP growth rates averaged 5 per cent per annum,
while inflation fell significantly if somewhat
erratically during the period. After an initial fall to
10 per cent in 1985 (with good weather causing
food prices to fall) inflation went up to almost 40
per cent in 1990, but declined to 10 per cent in 1992.
Real interest rates turned positive and the budget
(excluding capital expenditures financed by project
loans and grants) recorded surpluses from 1986 to
1991. The balance of payments situation has im-
proved as exports have picked up and external
inflows increased, albeit the visible trade deficit
has grown sharply primarily because of the collapse
of cocoa prices.
By 1986, the fiscal deficit had turned in to a moderate
surplus, while money supply growth slowed down
to 18 per cent by 1990. Cocoa, a major export crop,
benefiting from higher producer prices due to a
more realistic exchange rate, recorded a major turn
round from an all-time low output of less than 160,000
tonnes in 1983 to 260,000 tonnes in 1988, although
negative global price shifts meant 1988 cocoa export
earnings were below 1983. Minerals and timber and
products also recorded significant increases as a
result of the exchange rate reform.
In spite of the impressive performance, the
economy faced major setbacks in 1992. After a long
period of surpluses, the governmentbudget recorded
a large deficit equivalent to almost 5 per cent of
GDP instead of a projected surplus. The deficit
was largely financed by borrowing from the
banking system, resulting in a 5 per cent increase
in the Money Supply. Agricultural production
declined by 0.6 per cent in 1992 with overall real
GDP growth limited to 3.9 per cent compared with
a programme target of 5 per cent. On the external
front, the current account deficit widened largely
on account of shortfalls in cocoa receipts, and a
strong import growth resulting from the high
monetary growth.
The large monetary, fiscal and external sector
imbalances in 1992 were due to a number of
factors including bad weather, deteriorating terms
of trade, inadequate foreign inflows and
preparation for elections during the latter part of
the year.
To correct the slippages in policy implementation
that occurred in 1992 and return the economy to
an adjustment path that is consistent with attaining
the dual objectives of balance of payment viability
and accelerated growth, the government introduced
a corrective macroeconomic programme in 1993.
Specific targets included: a real GDP growth
rate of about 4.5 per cent; inflation of 20 per
cent; and an overall balance of payments surplus
of $168 million.
3 FISCAL POLICY AND REFORMS SINCE 1983
The large fiscal deficits recorded during the late
1970s and early 1980s were a result of:
a decline in external trade (the most important
source of government revenue from export as well as
import duties) due to an overvalued exchange rate;
b rapid nominal wage increases unrelated to pro-
ductivity;
c ineffective control over public expenditures (al-
beit at very low total levels relative to GDP);
d lack of financial discipline and accountability.
Because of the poor fiscal performance, the govern-
ment resorted to the Central Bank to finance its
deficits. With declining revenue, government ex-
penditure was cut sharply, services declined and
the economic and social infrastructure of Ghana
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deteriorated. Capital spending, for instance, plum-
meted from 4.5 per cent of GDP in 1975 to only
0.6 per cent of GDP by 1983 while recurrent was
barely over 5 per cent.
The launching of the Economic Recovery Program-
me (ERP) in 1983 had as one of its major aims, the
restoration of fiscal discipline. Ghana's fiscal policy
since 1983 has therefore been directed at correcting
the fiscal imbalances, reforming the tax system to
augment revenue collection and expenditure moni-
toring systems to have a handle on government
expenditure. The fiscal policy under the ERP was
implemented in three overlapping stages which
focused on: j) controlling the rate of growth of
government expenditure; ii) increasing govern-
ment revenue, and iii) minimizing the size of
the deficit on recurrent account, thereby reducing
government recourse to the banking system to
finance deficits and eventually realizing a surplus
on government current transactions.
Initially (1983-84), the government responded to the
fiscal deterioration by relying on expenditure
cuts and the restoration of the tax base. In the
second stage, covering 1985-1986, the objectives
of fiscal policy were broadened to include,
besides fiscal stabilization, the rehabilitation and
expansion of the basic economic and social
infrastructure and with greater external inflows
expenditure management, not net cuts, became
the basic objective.
Finally, in the third stage, beginning in 1987, in-
creased emphasis was placed on further strengthen-
ing of economic incentives, particularly for private
savings and investment and promoting equity
investment.
Expenditure control measures adopted included:
i suspension of development projects considered
non-viable;
ii introduction of a mechanized pay voucher
system and payment of salaries of civil servants
through the banks to eliminate ghost workers on
government pay rolls;
iii elimination of government subsides on petro-
leum products;
iv retrenchment of labour in the public sector.
Measures taken to increase government revenue
included:
j the intensification of tax education of the public;
ii widening of the tax net to incorporate as many
self-employed people as possible;
iii the restructuring of tax administration to im-
prove collection procedures;
iv reorganization of revenue collection agencies with
improved conditions of service to motivate them to
discharge their duties efficiently;
y conversion of indirect taxes from specific to ad
valorem.
The 1984 Budget benefited from the impact of ex-
change rate adjustments on receipts from cocoa
taxes and import duties. The 1985 Budget incorpo-
rated a more growth oriented fiscal strategy.
Government capital spending was expanded from
1986 in the context of a rolling three-year public
investment programme, thus necessitating a stepped-
up mobilization of domestic revenue. Exchange rate
adjustments in 1985 contributed to higher revenue
from taxes on international trade, while the general
economic recovery resulted in a higher collection
of taxes on domestic goods and services and on
corporate incomes.
Since 1987, the focus of fiscal policy has been
broadened to encompass enhancing the efficiency
and equity of the tax system. The pace of tax
reforms was accelerated and more attention
was paid to strengthening private sector incentives.
Tax administration was also strengthened through
efficiency to increase tax compliance among
the self-employed and to monitor more closely
corporate accounts, while efforts have been made
to improve the efficiency of government financial
operations.
In the area of direct taxes, corporate tax rates were
lowered in 1988 from 55 per cent to 45 per cent for
business in manufacturing, farming, and exporting,
and from 55 per cent to 50 per cent in 1989 for the
remaining firms, other than those in banking,
insurance, commerce and printing. The 1991 budget
provided for a further reduction to 35 per cent in the
corporate tax rate applicable to agriculture, manu
facturing, real estate, construction and services.
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These tax reforms created an environment more con-
ducive to private savings and investment.
The system of indirect taxation has also been re-
formed in the last several years. In 1987, all excise
duties on products other than petroleum, beverages
and tobacco were abolished, with the revenue loss
compensated for by an increase in the standard gen-
eral sales tax rate from 10 to 20 per cent and subse-
quently to 25 per cent. In 1989 this rate was reduced
to 22.5 per cent and in the context of the 1991 budget
was lowered further to 17.5 per cent.
On the expenditure side, the Government's main
objectives have been:
i to raise civil service wages to more competitive
levels as well as to widen the differential between the
highest and lowest paid civil servants, in order to
attract and retain highly skilled staff (with wages and
salaries rising from 25 per cent of the total budget in
1983 to 34 per cent in 1992);
ii to channel additional resources to capital ex-
penditure for the rehabilitation of the nation's infra-
structure with appropriate allocations for outlays on
operations and maintenance, particularly in the pri-
ority sector of agriculture, education and health (with
the capital budget rising from 12 per cent to 20 per
cent of total spending);
iii to ensure that the benefits of economic reforms
are broadly shared and that problems of poverty are
addressed.
4 APPRAISAL OF OUT-TURNS
4.1 Revenue
Since 1983, substantial increases have been received
in revenue attributable to the new measures
implemented to improve the tax collection
machinery, administration and collection procedures
as well as the general improvement in the
economy. The revenue as a proportion of GDP
increased from 4.1 per cent in 1981, reaching a
peak of 12.7 per cent in 1987, before declining
to 11.6 per cent in 1990. The composition of tax
revenue has changed significantly with individual
income and export taxes a significantly smaller
share than in 1983, but corporate income tax
and indirect taxes on imports and domestic goods
a larger proportion.
4.2 Expenditure
Expenditure - except for 1992 - has been kept
within budgetary limits. Total government expendi-
ture and net lending rose steadily from 8.2 per
cent of GDP in 1983 to 14.4 per cent in 1989,
before declining to 14.0 per cent of GDP in 1990. The
general increase in spending over time has reflected
increased emphasis on developing and rehabilitat-
ing the economic and social infrastructure.
There was a significant shift in the composition of
expenditure. Current expenditure in total spending
declined, as the share of both interest payments and
subsidies and transfers fell. Interest payments de-
clined between 1986 and 1988, from 15.5 to 8.0 per
cent of total spending, reflecting the shift of the
recurrent budget into surplus. In 1990, however,
interest payments increased, owing in part to the
assumption of responsibility by the Government for
foreign interest payments due from certain state-
owned enterprises experiencing financial difficul-
ties, and the replacement of the Bank of Ghana's
revaluation losses outstanding at the end of 1989 and
the cost of open market operations with government
bonds.
Subsidies and transfers, which comprised 27 per
cent of expenditure in 1983, now account for 10 per
cent. Direct subsidies to state-owned enterprises
have been virtually eliminated, as part of a general
push by the Government to enhance the efficiency
and performance of the state enterprise sector. By
early 1991, some 40 state enterprises had been
divested, while for several major enterprises that
are slated to remain in the Government's portfolio,
a number of steps have been taken to strengthen
their financial position and monitor their perform-
ance. These included the preparation of rolling three
year corporate plans and the signing of annual
performance agreements with the Government. In
addition, efforts are under way to liberalize the
administrative and institutional environment with-
out which state enterprises operate to improve their
autonomy, accountability and profitability.
4.3 Fiscal balance
In 1982, Ghana was running a budgetary deficit
of about 6.3 per cent of GDP. This was reduced
sharply to 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1983 by
expenditure controls. The deficit shifted into a
surplus in 1986 which grew to 1.4 per cent of GDP
by 1989 before declining to 0.2 per cent of GDP
by 1990.
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Reductions in the fiscal deficit (including grants as
revenue) over time, as well as the availability of
concessional foreign financing, have allowed the
Government to reduce its recourse to net domestic
borrowing and to make, since 1987, large net repay-
ments to the banking system which amounted on
average to the equivalent of 1.2 per cent of GDP a
year during 1987-90. The reduced demands by the
Government on domestic financial resources have
allowed a sizeable expansion in real terms of credit to
the private sector. In addition, the Government
contributed 0.8 per cent of GDP towards the cost of
financial sector reform in 1990.
4.4 Monetary policy
The main goal of monetary policy under the ERP
(1983-86) was to hold the growth of money supply
within reasonable levels. The target was to reduce
the rate of growth of money supply from an annual
average of 40 per cent between 1975 and 1983 to a
range of 10 per cent to 15 per cent by the end of 1986.
To achieve this goal, the Bank of Ghana introduced
various policy measures relating to interest rates and
credit with the aim of encouraging the mobilization
of domestic savings and channelling the flow of
credit to the productive sectors of the economy.
The thrust of credit policy under the ERP was geared
towards reducing government dependence on the
banking system. To this end, credit to government
was kept under tight control and quantitative per-
formance criteria were set to ensure budget disci-
pline. With respect to the rest of the economy, credit
ceilings were initially used to control and direct
credit to productive sectors. However, credit ceilings
coupled with lack of investment opportunities led to
excess liquidity in the banking system and wide
margins between lending and borrowing rates as
banks attempted to cover their costs and make prof-
its. In order to improve liquidity management and
encourage deposit mobilization, the Bank of Ghana
embarked on a systematic deregulation of the
system from 1987 to January 1992 when ceilings
were completely removed.
Interest rate policy was aimed at achieving
positive real interest rates to facilitate deposit
mobilization and contribute to a reduction in the
rate of inflation. Before 1987, interest rates
were administratively determined by the Central
Bank in line with inflationary pressures. By
February 1988 all interest rates were deregulated.
Interest rate policy then shifted from administrative
control to a market determined system with the
Bank of Ghana using the bank rate since
November 1990 as a tool of intervention in the
money market.
A major objective has also been to put in place a new
system of monetary control whereby overall liquid-
ity is managed primarily through control of the
net domestic assets by the Bank of Ghana through
open-market operations and other market-based
instruments, rather than through credit ceilings
on individual banks. Another important aspect of
improving the functioning of the money market was
the introduction of Discount Houses in 1987.
Since July 1990 the Bank of Ghana has imple-
mented several measures to stimulate the banks to
mobilize resources. Among such measures were the
widening and deepening of the bills market, the
introduction of transparency in transactions and a
programme of publicity. Other measures are
deregulation of bank charges and the payment
of interest on commercial banks balances with the
Bank of Ghana.
4.5 Banking sector restructuring
Restructuring of Ghana's Banking sector became
urgent and necessary when diagnostic studies con-
ducted by international consultants and auditors at
the request of Government in 1987 revealed that
many banks were financially weak, unprofitable,
illiquid, undercapitalized and in a few cases techni-
cally bankrupt. The causes of the widespread bank-
ing sector distress were attributed to rapid changes
in the macroeconomic environment under the
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), past political
interference and poor management practices. Efforts
to liberalize trade and other economic activities
under the ERP coupled with continuous adjustment
of the exchange rates to reflect underlying economic
conditions exposed many of the bank's corporate
customers to foreign exchange risks and made them
unable to service their maturing obligations, which
in turn increased the non-performing loans of the
banks and adversely affected their liquidity and
capital adequacy positions.
Since the causes of the banking sector distress were
largely due to exogenous factors, the Government's
approach to the problem was broad-based, policy-
oriented, pragmatic and directed at the financial
system as a whole. The Financial Sector Adjustment
Programme (FINSAP) initiated in 1988 and sup-
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ported by the IMF and the World Bank with credit of
SDR 72,000,000 and other resources from the Swiss
and Japanese Governments had objectives which
aimed at improving the financial system as a
whole. These objectives were stated as to: 1) enhance
the soundness of banking institutions; 2) improve
deposit mobilization and increase efficiency in
credit allocations; 3) develop efficient money and
capital markets, and 4) improve mechanisms for
rural finance.
The programme of action designed and implemented
in the area of banking sector restructuring included:
1 review and revision of the legal framework and
environment for banking;
2 improved supervision and external audit of
banks including improving the Bank of Ghana
supervisory skills and effectiveness through training
to apply internationally accepted audit and account-
ing standards;
3 restructuring banking institutions, after identify-
ing problems and weaknesses of each bank,
through preparing and implementing short-term,
turn around restructuring plans.
Implementation was substantially completed at the
end of December, 1990. The Bank of Ghana pur-
chased non-performing assets from the banks
amounting to C52 billion under the programme.
FINSAP bonds issued to the banks total C30.2
billion while the balance of C21.8 billion was offset
against obligations owed to Government or Bank of
Ghana by the banks. The FINSAP bonds issued
were of two categories. State Owned Enterprises
(50Es) non-performing assets were replaced with a
series of bonds with five years maximum maturity
and an interest rate of 12 per cent per annum. Private
sector enterprises (PSEs) non-performing assets with
the banks were, however, replaced with bonds with
maximum maturity of ten years at 7.4 per cent
per annum. FINSAP bonds are negotiable in the
secondary market but discountable at the Bank of
Ghana only at the discretion of the latter. They do not
automatically qualify as secondary reserve assets
and may be redeemed prematurely at the discretion
of the Bank of Ghana. Other banking restructuring
measures included the injection of cash equity
into some banks, the conversion of some long-term
loans due to Government and Bank of Ghana
into equity and the assumption of all foreign credit
obligations of the banks incurred before the
inception of the ERP. Institutional measures were
also implemented to upgrade and improve policies,
procedures and systems. Board of Directors and
Managing Directors of all distressed banks were
changed and the bank's managements strengthened
through training arrangements or the attachment of
experienced bankers to the banks.
It was recognized that the viability of the banks to a
large extent depended on the financial strength and
credit-worthiness of their customers. It was there-
fore considered necessary that the corporate sector
be given financial and management support to im-
prove its performance and profitability. A second
Financial Sector Restructuring Programme (FINSAP
II) has therefore been put in place to address corpo-
rate sector distress and to strengthen the operational
capabilities and systems of the Bank of Ghana. The
Government will also reduce its shareholding in
most banks to 40 per cent or less.
4.6 Exchange rate policies
The most far-reaching and controversial of the
policy measures adopted under the ERP was the
devaluation of the cedi in October 1983. The
exchange rate adjustment process was initiated
earlier in April 1983 with the introduction of a
scheme of surcharges and bonuses. Under this
scheme, surcharges were levied on the use of foreign
exchange while bonuses were paid on foreign ex-
change earnings. In effect the scheme gave rise to a
multiple exchange rate system under which US$1.00
equalled C23.38 on the lower side and C29.98 on the
higher side, with a weighted average of C25.00 -
about an 89 per cent devaluation from a previous rate
of C2.75.
The operation of this system proved to be cumber-
some. In October 1983, therefore, the two rates
were unified at US$1.00 = C30.00, implying a
further depreciation of 21.5 per cent. Since then
the authorities have been pursuing a flexible
exchange rate policy with the view to keeping
the exchange value of the cedi in line with price
developments in Ghana as compared with price
developments in the economies of Ghana's principal
trading partners.
The flexible exchange rate policy was pursued by
periodic announcements of the exchange rate until
September 1986 when the weekly foreign exchange
auction system was introduced. The exchange rate
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at that time was C90.00 to $1.00, having risen
form C2.75 = $1 in 1983. This system was aimed at
determining the weekly exchange rate through the
interplay of the forces of demand and supply as
against the earlier system where the foreign exchange
rate was administratively determined on the basis of
economic indicators.
While a flexible exchange rate policy was being
pursued through the auction market for foreign
exchange, the process of trade and exchange liberali-
zation was continued. The foreign exchange bureaux
scheme was introduced in early 1988 as part of the
trade and exchange liberalization policy. These two
markets, that is the foreign exchange auction and the
forex bureaux, were expected to ensure a more effi-
cient allocation of foreign exchange resources. Fur-
ther, by a process of gradually widening access to
auction funds, it was expected that the spread be-
tween the exchange rates in the two markets would
narrow until the two rates converge at the equilib-
rium exchange rate. In the first several years the
divergences were substantial and erratic but by 1991
they were under 10 per cent. The attainment of this
goal would provide the signal for the elimination of
virtually all foreign exchange restrictions.
The flexible exchange rate policy pursued as part
of the measures under the ERP continued into 1992.
In this regard an interbank foreign exchange market
in its rudimentary form was introduced in April
1990. In the market, authorized dealer banks
were permitted by the Bank of Ghana to trade
in foreign exchange among themselves provided
the foreign exchange traded in was not subject to
surrender requirements.
The interbank market was then supported by a
weekly wholesale foreign exchange auction at the
Bank of Ghana. In March 1992, the wholesale
auction was abolished and a fully-fledged interbank
market introduced. The introduction of the interbank
market was aimed at:
i continuing the liberalization of the exchange,
trade and payments system;
ii allowing for the continuous interplay of the
forces of demand and supply in the determination
of exchange rates;
iii furthering the unification of exchange rates in the
foreign exchange markets;
iv allowing for the free movement of foreign ex-
change from surplus to deficit units and,
y allowing for the Bank of Ghana to assume and
better perform the role of interventionist in the for-
eign exchange market.
In order to ensure the financial deepening of the
market for the achievement of the desired objectives,
the Bank of Ghana, in July 1991 modified the
surrender requirements for export receipts. Under
the modified arrangements, the surrender require-
ments were moved from the Bank of Ghana to the
commercial banks. The authorized dealer banks
were permitted to retain foreign exchange arising
from export of goods and services except those from
gold and cocoa. They were also permitted to use
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the proceeds purchased from exporters to finance
foreign exchange transactions either for themselves
or on behalf of their customers. As part of the
liberalization process in the trade and exchange
system, authorized foreign exchange dealer banks
were permitted to approve and effect all foreign
exchange transactions without reference to the Bank
of Ghana. The transactions included payments for
imports, technology transfers and investment in some
and over-the-counter purchases of foreign currency.
Thus over the decade from 1982 Ghana moved back
to market based exchange rates and de facto current
account convertibility with few severe crises albeit
the new system remains highly vulnerable to cocoa
(or gold) price and foreign resource transfer shocks.
(Tables to this article follow on pages 63-66.)
TABLE 1: SELECTED MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
Source: Bank of Ghana; Ghana Statistical Service: Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics, Several Issues
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1980 1981 1982 1983
Real GDP Growth (%) 0.50 (6.90) (4.60) (4.60)
Inflation rate (annual average) 50.10 : 116.50 22.30 122.80
Nominal GDP (C'm) 42853.00 86,451.00 1 184,038.00 184,038.00
Average Exchange Rate (C/$) 2.75 2.75 2.75 9.56
Export of Goods & Services ($m) 1,212.60 : 831.70 747.90 : 477.80
Goods 1,103.60 710.70 : 641.30 439.30
Services 109.00 121.00 106.60 : 38.50
Central Govt Budget Def (% of GDP) (1.00) (6.40) (4.50) (2.60)
Money Supply Growth (%) 46.30 28.10 37.00
1984 1985 1986
Real GDP Growth (%) 8.60 : 5.10 : 5.20
Inflation rate (annual average) 39.60 : 10.40 24.60
Nominal GDP (Cm) 270,561.00 343,048.00 511,373.00
Average Exchange Rate (C/$) 35.99 54.37 : 89.21
Export of Goods & Services ($m) 614.50 670.80 1 1,554.00
Goods 565.50 632.50 804.70
Services 49.00 38.30 749.30
Central Govt Budget Def (% of GDP) (1.80) (2.20) 0.10
Money Supply Growth (%) 57.60 60.70 54.50
1987 1988 1989
Real GDP Growth (%) 4.80 5.60 5.10
Inflation rate (annual average) 39.80 : 31.40 : 25.20
Nominal GDP (Cm) 746,000.00 1,051,196.00 1,417,214.00
Average Exchange Rate (C/$) 162.37 202.34 270.00
Export of Goods & Services ($m) 905.90 958.70 893.70
Goods 826.60 881.00 807.90
Services 79.30 77.70 85.80
Central Govt Budget Def (% of GDP) 0.50 0.80 0.70
Money Supply Growth (%) 53.90 43.00 26.90
1990 1991 1992
Real GDP Growth (%) : 3.30 5.30 3.90
Inflation rate (annual average) 37.20 18.00 : 10.00
Nominal GDP (Cm) : 2,031,686.00 2,574,774.00 3,253,256.00
Average Exchange Rate (C/$) : 326.33 367.78 437.09
Export of Goods & Services ($m) 989.70 1,108.00 1,115.20
Goods : 896.60 997.70 986.30
Services : 93.10 110.30 128.90
Central Govt Budget Def (% of GDP) 0.20 1.60 (4.80)
Money Supply Growth (%) 18.00 19.91 52.90
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY ACCOUNTS OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
(Millions of Cedis; end period)
1 For 1971-75, Net Foreign Assets valued at 1 Cedi + SDR 0.71842.
2 The series after 1978 is not strictly comparable with that of the preceding period becuase prior data on arrears payments did not
include arrears on service payment.
3 Excludes secondary banks up to 1983.
Source: Bank of Ghana; IMF Reports, 1973-83.
66
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Net Foreign Assets: -358 -1160 t -1024 -16676 -31440 -48702
Banking System 477 24 238 4031 9146 4610
NetlMFPosition -119 -78 -59 : -8405 -23388 t -39359
Post-1972 Payment Arrears -537 -955 -1051 -10399 -15402 -12263
Pre-1972 Payment Arrears -75 -54 -54 1 -335 -392 -209
Participation Arrears -104 -97 -98 -1568 -1404 -1481
Net DomesticAssets: 8404 12943 16004 22601 39237 66464
ClaimsonGovernment 6526 10655 11064 21059 24170 27176
Claims on Public Entities 400 441 527 813 676 4795
Cocoa Financing 1 1559 2950 5553 521 3580 13545
Claims on Non-Bank Fin. 74 107 1 129 200 897 13
ClaimsonPrivateSector 943 1345 1562 2841 12153 21178
NetOtherAssets -1098 -2555 -2831 : -2833 -2239 -243
RevaluationAccount 16158 29930 41884
MoneyandQuasi-Money: 7938 11637 14834 20495 34621 55625
Money 6087 9415 11205 16411 27370 43950
Quasi-Money 1851 2222 3629 4084 7251 11675
SDR Allocation 1 108 146 146 1588 3106 4021
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
NetForeignAssets: -130656 -141707 -141303 1-127903 -86376
Banking System 5327 17848 1 7315 1 -6197 21639
NetlMFPosition -113344 1-137006 -133670 -117131 -108015
Post-1972 Payment Arrears -18571 -17223 1 -10518 1 -2566 -
Pre-1972 Payment Arrears I - : - - -
Participation Arrears -4068 1 -5326 -4430 1 -2009
Net Domestic Assets: 94590 105335 116631 1102918 76149
Claims on Government 29647 22220 11008 -10454 -34012
Claims on Public Entities 5274 1 8610 10422 19674 24592
Cocoa Financing 16889 1 16471 1 21000 1 23747 1 17058
Claims on Non-Bank Fin. - - - - 1 -
ClaimsonPrivateSector 37455 1 46946 : 58183 : 61140 : 80218
NetOtherAssets 5325 1 11088 1 16018 1 8811 1 -11707
Revaluation Account 133135 1 179768 1 224990 276189 1 332332
Money and Quasi-Money: 85937 1 132263 1 189187 1240071 1 283242
Money 65816 1 95042 1139031 1185153 1 216958
Quasi-Money 20121 1 37221 1 50156 1 54918 1 66284
SoRAllocation 1 11132 1 11132 1 11132 1 11132 1 11132
Notes:
